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Internal and external factors on firms’ transfer pricing decisions: 
Insights from organization studies 
 
ABSTRACT 
Well understood in economics, accounting, finance, and legal 
research, transfer pricing has rarely been comprehensively explored 
in organization management literature. This paper explores some 
theoretical explanations of transfer pricing within multidivisional firms 
drawing insights from various organizational theories - primarily 
institutional theory, transaction cost economics, and social networks - 
to develop a conceptual model of transfer pricing. This model focuses 
on the nature of multidivisional firms' internal transfers, internal and 
external technological environments, and internal and external social 
environments. We highlight the importance of transfer pricing as a 
key strategic dimension to understand intra-firm flows and their 
associated costs.  
 
 
Keywords: theory, value, transfer pricing, intra-firm flows, 
multidivisional firm. 
 - 5 - 
Kim: “I … don’t understand why it would make sense to pay $450/ton for 
pulp [to buy internally from Northwestern’s U.S. pulp mills] when I can 
get it for $330/ton from Chile.”  
Ewing: “I understand your motivation for wanting to source the pulp 
from Chile, but it is important [to buy inside] for the corporation to act 
as an integrated team.”  
 -- Barrett and Slape (2000: 597) 
The quote above is an excerpt from a phone conversation 
between Bill Ewing, the Vice President of Northwestern Paper 
Company1, and Arthur Kim, the Director of Northwestern's South 
Korean subsidiary. After this conversation, Ewing likely questioned 
himself on the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing internal 
transfer prices. For example, given that some subsidiaries are located 
in lower tax jurisdictions2, would it not be logical to set lower internal 
transfer prices from the U.S. to those subsidiaries? Would it not be 
logical to allow the Korean subsidiary to purchase from outside 
suppliers given that internal transfer prices are much higher than 
market prices in Chile? Allowing subsidiaries to outsource externally 
would lead to the bankruptcy of the US subsidiaries, which would not 
have enough demand for their products? What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of a reward system based on the allocation of 
internal consumption? Is the allocation process "fair" to each 
subsidiary? Is it "fair" to the company as a whole? Questions and 
doubts on transfer pricing probably haunt not only Mr. Ewing and the 
                                                 
1 Northwestern Paper Company is an Oregon-based firm founded in 1916. Northwestern Paper Company 
had grown into one of the largest U.S. producers of pulp and paper products by the 1950s. 
2 As of early 1994, the federal corporate tax rate in the U.S. was 34%, with South Korean taxes ranging 
from 20% to 34%. 
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Northwestern Paper Company, but more generally all the managers 
who need to set internal prices for intra-firm flows of goods and 
services.  
Transfer pricing is a major concern for multinational corporations 
(MNCs) as might be highlighted by the fact that approximately 80% 
of Fortune 1000 must select transfer pricing strategies, requiring a 
complex array of financial, legal, and operational considerations 
(Eccles, 1985: 2). In addition, intra-firm trade accounts for about 
55% of the international trade between the EU and Japan, 40% of the 
trade between the EU and the US, and 80% of the trade between 
Japan and the US (Stewart, 1993). That is, a large proportion of the 
international trade is actually intra-MNC and occurs among 
subsidiaries of the MNCs. These MNCs rely on internal transfer prices 
to value their intra-firm flows. Furthermore, transfer pricing is also a 
concern for governments and regulatory agencies because the 
manner in which MNCs price these intra-firm flows of tangible and 
intangible assets (Eden & Boos, 2003) across national boundaries 
impacts the distribution of tax income among countries. But transfer 
pricing is also important for the majority of multi-divisional firms, 
even if they do not carry out international operations.  
The transfer price is the value (or price) placed on the goods, 
services and intangibles that are transferred within the firms, as it 
moves from one organizational entity (e.g., a division, an unit, a 
 - 7 - 
subunit, a division3) to another within a corporate group (Eccles, 
1985; Cravens, 1997). Hence, while the role of prices is to efficiently 
allocate resources in the market, the role of transfer prices is to 
efficiently allocate resources within the firm. Despite substantial 
interests by scholars, the transfer pricing is still largely regarded as 
an accounting issue and hence has seen little penetration into the 
core management literature. Research on transfer pricing has been 
mainly carried out by economists, accounting professionals, and 
lawyers. It is not surprising that the primary focus has been on 
taxation considerations. In addition, much of the existing literature is 
largely atheoretical or, at least, does not include well-developed 
theory. Hence, it is also not surprising that the majority of existing 
research has seldom utilized established management theories to 
examine other dimensions (e.g., strategic, social networks, 
technological) of transfer pricing, or the strategic implications of 
transfer pricing decisions (with some notable exceptions, such as 
Eccles (1985)). In fact, we have limited knowledge and 
understanding of fundamental questions such as: why there has been 
an increase in the variety of transfer pricing practices; how 
transaction characteristics impact transfer prices; how technological 
and business environment influence transfer prices; and how inter-
divisional relationships affect the firms’ transfer pricing decisions.  
In this paper we draw insights from organizational theories and 
                                                 
3 In this paper we utilize the terminology subunits, divisions, departments, units and subsidiaries 
interchangeably. 
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current management research, and integrate these insights into a 
fairly comprehensive understanding of transfer pricing by 
multidivisional firms. We specifically focus on three main streams of 
research: transaction cost economics, institutional theory, and social 
network theory. We, therefore, examine three aspects that affect 
firms’ transfer pricing decisions: (1) the nature of internal transfers; 
(2) the firms’ internal and external technological environments; and 
(3) the firms’ internal and external social environments. In the first 
section of the paper, we briefly review the extant literature and 
research and describe transfer pricing of multidivisional firms. In the 
second section, we examine the factors that influence transfer pricing 
and propose a conceptual model that incorporates a strategic 
dimension to transfer pricing. We conclude with a discussion on the 
implications for practice and possible future research avenues.  
TRANSFER PRICING: FOCUS AND APPROACHES 
Transfer prices may apply to departments, divisions, 
subsidiaries, or affiliate business units (Cravens, 1997; Eden & Boos, 
2003). The use of transfer pricing emerged with the hierarchical 
multi-divisional organization. This is because as firms grow they need 
to organize production in multiple divisions and hence have a 
tendency to departmentalize knowledge and activities into more 
specialized subunits (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). As Hayek (1937) 
noted, the division of labor is inevitably accompanied by a division of 
knowledge. However, the interdependence created by divisional 
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specialization in large multidivisional firms increases intra-firm flows, 
which necessitates a transfer price system to govern these 
exchanges/flows between divisions. A clear transfer pricing system is 
also important for divisional managers because they are frequently 
held accountable for revenues and costs (profit center) (Brickley, 
Smith, & Zimmerman, 2001: 433).  
The concept of transfer price can be traced to the 1880s ( Eccles, 
1985; see also Cox, Howe, & Boyd, 1997). Notwithstanding, it is 
worth noting that when discussing the theory of exchange value of 
material products, in The Principles of Political Economy, Harry 
Sidgwick (1901) recognized the possibility that producers could 
consume some of their own outputs. This possibility complicated his 
assumption that products were produced to be sold on the external 
market. In Sidgwick’s years, most firms manufactured only one 
product or a narrow line of products. The later boom of decentralized 
multi-unit firms elevated transfer-pricing problems and caught 
scholars’ attention. 
Economists and accounting researchers made pioneer 
contributions to the current understanding of transfer prices. For 
example, Hirshleifer (1956) first formalized the transfer-pricing 
problem in economics, arguing that the market price was the correct 
transfer price only when the commodity being transferred was 
produced in a perfectly competitive market. If the market was not 
perfectly competitive, or if the market for the transferred commodity 
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did not exist, the “correct” transfer price would be the marginal cost, 
given certain simplifying conditions4. Accounting scholars considered 
both economic arguments and real business needs, and devoted 
research efforts to taxation-minimization concerns (e.g., Grebmer, 
1987) and the development of a double accounting system (e.g., 
Boer, 1999).  Undeniably, saving tax money is beneficial for the 
firms’ profitability in the short term, but ignoring internal coordination 
may turn out to be detrimental for the firms' long-run profitability. 
Albeit tax is indeed a potentially important factor in determining an 
optimal transfer price, by no means it is the only one.  
Two conditions make transfer pricing an unavoidable component 
for a multidivisional firm’s efficiency. First, the agency hazards within 
multidivisional firms make transfer pricing necessary for internal 
management, and stem from a lack of congruence between the 
interests of the agent and the principal (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). There are at least two general 
types of agency problems that can be observed in large 
multidivisional firms: (1) the division’s misrepresentation of the firm’s 
interests as a whole, and (2) the conflicts among the divisions, which 
convey negative spillover effects (Eden & Li, 2003). Thus, an “ideal” 
transfer pricing system depends on the comparison of the firms’ total 
costs and benefits; that is, the spillovers between divisions must be 
included in the transfer price. Unfortunately, as we will discuss, an 
                                                 
4 Hirshleifer’s analysis is based on the assumptions of technological independence and demand 
independence. 
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ideal system, although simple to state conceptually, is often difficult 
to implement in practice and requires the formulation and 
interpretation of the focal firm's strategy.  
Second, imperfect and asymmetric information (Ouchi, 1979; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990) justifies the 
existence of a transfer pricing method even in the absence of other 
agency problems. Perfect information may not be attainable due to 
(1) the unavailability of certain information to the central 
management (such as the corporate headquarters) or the other 
divisions, and/or (2) the difficulties, or high costs, of moving 
information across subunits. For example, in large multidivisional 
firms knowledge generally resides at lower levels within the firm 
where it assumes a private nature and tends to be costly to either 
transfer and/or verify by outsiders (Szulanski, 1996). Under 
conditions of imperfect information, the performance evaluation of 
business units/divisions requires establishing transfer prices for 
internally exchanged goods or services (Egelhoff, 1982; Eccles, 
1985). Because transfer pricing affects performance evaluations and 
hence managers' rewards, dispute over the transfer price between 
divisions is “virtually inevitable” (Brickley et al., 2001: 438). Transfer 
pricing serves not only as a system for internal efficient allocation of 
resources/costs, but it is also a mechanism for the coordination of 
subunits. 
Firms generally choose one of the three main approaches to 
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value internal transfers, these are: the negotiated price, the adjusted 
external-market price, and the cost-based price (see, for example, 
Eccles, 1985; Cravens, 1997). These approaches vary in the amount 
of subunit autonomy (see Table 1). A negotiated price is set through 
internal bidding, or direct negotiation, between the seller and the 
buyer divisions. This approach involves little or even no higher-level 
management. Because internal transfers only occur when both parties 
agree on an acceptable price, it is common to designate this as 
“internal market price”. Internal-market prices are employed when 
external referent prices do not exist or the firm's strategy requires 
divisional flexibility. An adjusted external-market price is set in 
proximity to the external market prices and hence reduces the 
division managers’ autonomy to set the transfer price. For instance, 
an adjusted external-market price may be determined as the market 
price minus a fixed discount, the best price to an outsider during a 
specific period, or the negotiated price with a listed price range. A 
cost-based price is set drawn from the supplier’s costs. This approach 
allows the selling division to charge a markup on the cost to cover 
overhead and provide a profit margin. This solution leaves the selling 
division with little flexibility in manipulating transfer prices because it 
requires the division to expose all cost-related information. Table 1 
summarizes these three different transfer pricing approaches and lists 
examples for each.  
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TABLE 1. A typology of transfer pricing 
Low subunit autonomy                                                        High subunit 
autonomy 
Cost-based price  Adjusted external-
market price 
 Negotiated/internal-
market price 
Information on 
supplier costs is 
referred to while 
setting transfer prices.  
 Prices on the external 
market serve as the 
referent for 
determining the values 
of internal transfers.  
 Managers of the trading 
profit centers establish 
a price that is 
acceptable to both the 
seller and the buyer 
before the exchange 
can be consummated. 
     
e.g., actual full 
production cost; 
standard production 
cost; full production 
cost plus a mark up; 
etc. 
 e.g., market price less 
a discount; best price 
to an outsider during a 
specific period; 
negotiated price with 
listed price range; etc. 
 e.g., negotiated prices 
between subunits, 
bidding. 
 
It is worth noting that the boundaries between these three 
approaches are not clear-cut. In fact, this classification in three 
approaches does not prevent firms from utilizing other transfer-
pricing methods that are better tailored to their idiosyncratic needs.  
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF TRANSFER PRICING  
To better understand transfer pricing within large multi-unit 
firms through management lenses, we propose a conceptual model of 
transfer pricing. This model integrates the insights from three main 
organizational theories - i.e., institutional theory, transaction cost 
economics, and social networks theory - that have proved useful in 
explaining other organizational phenomena. We trust that the 
utilization of these theories on transfer-pricing research may provide 
insightful perspectives and highlight the importance of transfer 
pricing specifically in corporate strategy and international 
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management.  
In our conceptual model, we examine various conditions that 
may affect firms' transfer pricing decisions. Specifically, we 
investigate how the nature of internal transfers, firms’ technological 
environments, and firms' social environments may influence transfer 
pricing. Figure 1 summarizes the main propositions advanced in the 
following sections. We focus on exploring the direct effects of these 
three factors on firms' transfer pricing decisions, and acknowledge 
that an explanation of possible interactions is beyond our scope, and 
an avenue for future studies.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The Nature of Internal Transfers 
The transfer pricing decisions are fundamentally influenced by 
the characteristics of the internally transferred products5 (Adler, 
1996). There are two critical dimensions of these internal transfers. 
First, transfer-pricing methods are likely to vary through the life cycle 
of the products subject to internal transfers. Hence, defining a 
transfer price for a product is even more complex for firms because 
this price is bound to vary as the focal products evolve along their life 
cycles (i.e., from introduction to growth, maturity, and decline). To 
some extent transfer prices are based on the availability of external 
referent prices. The rationale is rooted in classical economics 
arguments that in competitive markets the market price is the best 
                                                 
5 This paper employs “product” in a broad sense to include tangible and intangible goods, technologies, 
and services.  
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reference for evaluating internally transferred products (Hirshleifer, 
1956) and set a price for these internal transfers. However, when 
new products are first introduced, it may be difficult to find external 
market prices that may serve as a reference price; indeed an external 
market price may simply not exist. In contrast, it is easier to utilize 
external market prices as reference prices for mature products (Cats-
Baril, Gatti & Grinnell, 1988). Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that in many instances the internal transfers of newly 
developed products (or innovations) will likely be priced on the basis 
of manufacturing costs due to the lack of an external reference price, 
and, conversely, the valuation of internal transfers of mature 
products may rely on existing external market prices.  
Second, transfer prices are likely to vary throughout a 
multidivisional firm because intra-firm transactions involve different 
degrees of asset specificity. Williamson (1985: 55) defined asset 
specificity6 as “durable investments that are undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investment is 
much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should be 
original transaction be prematurely terminated”. In the presence of 
asset specificity, hold-up and moral hazard problems may emerge, 
and either the selling and/or the buying subunit may engage in 
opportunistic behaviors. For example, when the purchasing subunit 
refuses to acquire from the seller, the seller's investments in assets 
                                                 
6 Williamson (1985) identified four different types of asset specificity: site, physical asset, human asset, 
and dedicated assets specificity. 
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specific to the exchange cannot be inexpensively withdrawn or 
reassigned to other uses (Williamson, 1985; Spicer, 1988). Since the 
external market for such idiosyncratic assets is limited, external 
reference prices may not be available. Additionally, the potential ex 
post opportunistic behavior of the buyer may decrease the selling 
unit’s negotiation power once the investment is made. To eliminate 
potential transaction hazards related to asset specificity, cost-based 
prices are favored over negotiated prices by multi-unit firms, but 
demand proximate monitoring of the manufacturing processes 
(Spicer, 1988; Colbert & Spicer, 1995). Therefore, when standardized 
intermediate products are the objects of internal transfer, market 
prices will likely be the primary basis for setting internal transfer 
prices. When internally transferred intermediate products involve a 
moderate degree of customization, internal manufacturing costs will 
likely play a greater role in the initial negotiations to set transfer 
prices, and in any ex-post proposal to adjust them. Finally, when the 
internally transferred intermediate product is idiosyncratic and 
involves a large transaction-specific investment, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that internal manufacturing costs will likely be the primary 
basis for setting transfer prices, and that a larger degree of central 
control over the make-or-buy decision may be needed.   
Proposition 1: The characteristics of the goods transferred 
internally affect firms’ transfer pricing method, such that: 
Proposition 1a: Firms are more likely to utilize cost-based 
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transfer prices to value internal transfers of newly developed 
products, and to utilize adjusted external-market transfer prices to 
value internal transfers of mature products.  
Proposition 1b: Firms are more likely to utilize cost-based 
transfer prices to value internal transfers of idiosyncratic products, 
and to utilize adjusted external-market transfer prices to value 
internal transfers of standardized products.  
Internal Technological Environment 
The ‘internal technological environment’ refers to the degree of 
interdependence across different units within a firm that stems from 
the technological requirements of the activities performed by the 
firm. In this paper, we use Thompson's (1967) classification of 
technologies (i.e., long-linked, mediating, and intensive technologies) 
to develop the following arguments. The long-linked technologies 
represent the kind of serial interdependence within firms (i.e., action 
Z can be performed only after the successful completion of action Y) 
that can be best observed, for example, in mass assembly lines of 
standardized products. In these instances, to assure serial 
coordination, central control will tend to be high and the valuation of 
manufacturing costs will likely be based on attributing values to the 
intermediate goods transferred within the firm. This is, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that firm operating long-linked technologies 
will tend to define internal transfer prices based on costs incurred. 
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The mediating technologies may be best observed in service 
firms linking different types of clients to each other (cfr. Thompson, 
1967). For instance, banks serve as the “bridge” for the depositors 
and the borrowers. These organizations rely on standardization as the 
mechanism to coordinate among organizational units in firms 
operating with mediating technologies. Given that in these firms the 
internal competition may have a positive impact on the units’ 
performance, we suggest that external market prices will likely be 
used as referrals to set internal transfer prices. Lastly, the intensive 
technologies are characterized by a reliance on feedbacks from the 
product itself, and the technologies are largely customized. Under 
these conditions, it is likely that the costs for internal transfers are 
difficult to be determined. Moreover, it is probable that often referent 
market prices will not exist. Therefore, we suggest that internal 
transfer prices will be settled through internal negotiation between 
the subunits involved. In proposition form, we advance that: 
Proposition 2a: Firms are more likely to utilize cost-based prices 
when long-linked technologies are embedded in internal transfers. 
Proposition 2b: Firms are more likely to utilize adjusted market-
based prices when mediating technologies are embedded in 
internal transfers. 
Proposition 2c: Firms are more likely to utilize negotiated prices 
when intensive technologies characterize the inter-linkages among 
the activities originating the products for internal transfers.  
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Internal Social Environment 
The transfer-pricing problems only arise within a recognizable 
social system (e.g., an organization). Hence, additional insights may 
be drawn from considering transfer pricing in a broader social system 
context (Granovetter, 1985) in which internal flows occur. That is, we 
may gain insights by considering the internal social interfaces, or 
social networks, among subunits. Social networks can be defined as 
the collectivity of individuals, or individual groups, among whom 
exchanges take place and are supported by shared norms of 
trustworthiness (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Liebeskind et 
al., 1996) and social control mechanisms (Coleman, 1988). In fact, 
firms may be considered as networks of business units each 
performing specific functions and activities (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; 
Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994; Burt, 1997). Buckley and Casson (1998) 
documented the shift in contemporary organizations away from 
bureaucratic to newer, more flexible, possibly network-type 
organizational form. This shift brings to the forefront the importance 
of social capital (particularly trust) as a major coordination 
mechanism within the organization (Gulati, 1995). As Arrow (1974: 
23) stated “[t]rust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is 
extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of 
reliance on other people’s word”.  
Transfer pricing, hierarchical authority, and trust are largely 
intertwined as firms employ these three control mechanisms to 
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achieve governance and operational efficiency. Transfer-pricing 
methods provide managers with another tool for coordination 
(Westland, 1992), in addition to hierarchical authority and trust. 
Various transfer-pricing methods are employed to match different 
degrees of authority and trust to achieve the desired level of control 
over internal transfers of both tangible products and intangible assets 
(Eden & Boos, 2003). Moreover, these three control mechanisms do 
not substitute each other; rather, they tend to be largely 
complementary. For example, if there is more trust among the 
subunits, the quality, timeliness and speed of information flows will 
be higher and will spread across different divisions facilitating mutual 
understanding among the subunits (Zucker, 1986). Thus, high-levels 
of trust attenuate the need for authority’s involvement and limit the 
need for strict transfer pricing mechanisms. Stated differently, inter-
unit trust renders easier flows of information and reduces the 
uncertainties involved in interdivisional dependency. 
Therefore, we suggest that a higher level of trust between 
subunits is likely to lead to the use of negotiated transfer prices. 
Conversely, lower level of trust restricts information flows beyond 
formal report systems as imposed by hierarchical control. In these 
instances, all knowledge about internal transfers is either the 
reflection of external market prices (when they exist) or made known 
by headquarter requirements. Hence, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that a lower level of trust between subunits is likely to be associated 
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with the use of adjusted market-based prices and/or cost-based 
prices.  
Proposition 3: Firms are more likely to utilize negotiated transfer 
prices when inter-division trust is high, and to utilize adjusted 
external-market prices and/or cost-based prices when inter-
division trust is low.  
External Technological Environment 
 The ‘external technological environment’ refers to the pace of 
technological changes for the whole industry. It is likely that firms 
operating in stable external technological environment may more 
accurately make predictions on the major technological changes and 
their implications for firm performance, resources, and survival. In 
contrast, firms in unstable external technological environments will 
find it more hazardous to predict potential changes of the main 
technologies and the outcome of those changes (Lant & Mezias, 
1990; Brews & Hunt, 1999). The environmental (un)certainty may be 
assessed by the frequency of technological change, such that the 
more frequently major technologies change in an industry, the more 
uncertainty firms will experience (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Our 
proposition is that the characteristics of the external technological 
environment (e.g., in terms of technological stability) are likely to 
impact on the definition of the transfer prices firms use. 
 When technologies are fairly stable the products also tend to be 
reasonably standardized. Hence, we suggest that the easiest and 
 - 22 - 
cheapest way for firms in stable technological environments (i.e., 
with standardized products) to value internal transfers may be simply 
to utilize extant external market prices. Utilizing external market 
prices as referent values for inter-unit flows enables firms to save the 
costs of detecting and governing agency problems. Conversely, when 
technologies are unstable (i.e., heterogeneous products), firms may 
chose to internalize the links of their value chain (as transaction cost 
theory suggests – see, for example, Williamson, 1985). It is difficult 
for firms facing unstable external technological environments to find 
external referent prices. In fact, even when an open market price 
exists, referent prices may not be appropriate for firms facing 
different forms of technologies and pace of technological change. 
Therefore, we suggest that firms in unstable technological 
environments are more likely to utilize cost-based and/or negotiated 
transfer prices. In proposition form: 
Proposition 4: Firms are more likely to utilize adjusted external-
market prices when the external technological environments are 
stable, and to utilize cost-based and/or negotiated prices when the 
external technological environments are unstable.  
External Social Environment 
As any other organizational activity and decisions, transfer 
pricing should not be analyzed in isolation of the firms' external social 
context (Granovetter, 1985). Firms are not atomistic actors 
competing for profits against each other in a perfect marketplace 
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(Gulati, 1998). Instead, they are embedded in networks of social, 
professional, and exchange relationships with other organizations and 
agents in their surrounding environments (Granovetter, 1985). This 
view entail an open systems perspective that is akin to institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and 
represents a move towards recognizing that the organization and its 
activities are integrated not only with an external technological 
environment, but also with an external social environment (Scott, 
1998). Firm's success is contingent upon the extent to which it is able 
to gain legitimacy in the host marketplace. 
Firms need to be embedded in their social environment to gain 
legitimacy and assure firms’ survival and growth (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). To gain legitimacy, organizations 
respond to institutional forces placed on them by the external social 
agents (Oliver, 1990). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) specified three 
mechanisms firms may utilize to "fit" within the host environment and 
designated the process as isomorphism. As an organization seeks 
legitimacy it may endeavor to resemble (or become isomorphic) other 
firms operating in the host environment through one of three 
processes: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism 
emanates from an external authority and results in the need to 
conform to the expectations of other organizations from which the 
focal firm depends for resources. Mimetic isomorphism is atypical 
response to conditions of uncertainty and involves imitating 
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incumbent firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haunschild & Miner, 
1997; Haveman, 1993). According to Haveman (1993) the focal firm 
may utilize successful firms, large firms, firms of similar size, or firms 
in the same industry as the referent others to imitate strategies and 
market positions. Finally, normative isomorphism is typically a 
reflection of the influence of professional communities, who by their 
actions shape organizational forms and practices. For example the 
knowledge produced by academic specialists and the norms created 
through industry associations determine the degree of normative 
pressures upon firms. It seems reasonable to advance that as an 
internal practice with broad impact on the firms' operations, the 
selection of transfer pricing method is likely to be subject to the firms' 
institutional environment.  
Organizational practices are often either direct reflections of, or 
strategic responses to, rules and structures built into their larger 
environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997; Scott, 1998). 
For example, firms’ transfer pricing has to comply with the laws, 
regulations, and rules exerted by its external environment (coercive 
pressures). Section 482 regulations issued by the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) are the basis for the US firms’ transfer pricing 
methods. These regulations represent the coercive/regulative 
institutional pressures for all US firms. The industry associations also 
often issue reference prices for intermediate products. Although these 
are commonly labeled as “recommended transfer pricing”, firms that 
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fail to comply with these “recommendations” may face legal disputes 
or suffer collective sanctions. Tang (2002) noted that normative 
isomorphism in transfer pricing practices has been observed in recent 
years. It is worth noting that due tot he complexity of government 
regulations on transfer pricing, firms increasingly turn to professional 
companies (or consultants) for aid in establishing transfer prices 
(Ernst & Young, 2001). This is more complex for multinational firms 
carrying operations in several countries and facing different sets of 
regulations.   
It seems reasonable to suggest that transfer-pricing methods 
can be learned or imitated. That is particularly true when transfer 
pricing methods can be observed directly (Gox, 2000). Even though 
transfer-pricing practices are typically not “crystal-clear” to outsiders 
and involve some ambiguity, knowledge on transfer pricing methods 
can still flow across organizational boundaries through the movement 
of executives, communication between personnel, or some form of 
industry associations and meetings. Usually firms' decisions to imitate 
other firms' transfer pricing methods are largely based on the 
analysis of a causally ambiguous relationship between transfer pricing 
practices and firm success. Notwithstanding, the salience of the 
outcomes of different transfer pricing methods and the level of 
uncertainty involved will likely determine how imitation occurs 
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997). That is, when faced with uncertainty, 
organizations tend to rely more on social indicators, and on the 
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observation of other firms' transfer pricing methods. In these 
instances, imitation becomes more likely. Thus, when the causality 
between the transfer pricing method and firm performance is vague 
and the industry environment is unstable, imitation of seemingly 
successful organizations in the same industry (possibly even across 
industries) may be utilized to enhance firm’s likelihood of survival. 
We suggest in proposition form that: 
Proposition 5a: Firms' external institutional environment is likely 
to affect transfer pricing either through government/industrial 
regulations, professional norms, and/or imitation of successful 
firms.  
 In the late 1970s, Meyer and Rowan (1977) stressed firms' 
difficulties to adjust to both institutional expectations and the need 
for efficiency. The authors identified two general problems. First, 
technical activities and demands for efficiency create conflicts and 
inconsistencies in an institutionalized organization’s efforts to conform 
to the ceremonial rules of production. Second, because these 
ceremonial rules are transmitted by myths that may arise from 
different parts of the environment, these rules may conflict with each 
other.   
At different stages of institutionalization, the balance between 
survival and efficiency is likely to vary. For example, in the pre-
institutional stage (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998), the tendency to 
imitate incumbent firms is low for several reasons. First, the 
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relationship between certain practices and superior performance has 
not been completely disclosed. Second, the public has not formed a 
stereotype of legitimacy regarding those practices. Therefore, in the 
pre-institutional stage institutional pressures to adopt specific 
transfer-pricing methods are low. Hence, we suggest that decisions to 
comply with the institutional environment depend mostly on economic 
and technical considerations. In other words, efficiency considerations 
are likely to overrun external institutional pressures. However, as 
more organizations adopt a certain transfer-pricing method the 
pressures to conform to prevailing practices is likely to increase. The 
logic – “if leading companies are doing it, so should I” – plays an 
increasingly important role, while economic efficiency rationale is 
likely to become less important, or even taken-for-granted by 
follower firms.  
Furthermore, it is likely that different firms have different 
abilities to resist external institutional pressures.  For example, 
Barringer and Milkovich (1998) noted that firms' size is an important 
indicator of firms’ ability to resist institutional pressures and to 
initiate actions that break away from prevailing institutional norms. 
This is because large firms possess more slack resources that 
increase firm's resilience and resistance to institutional pressures, 
than small firms (Greening & Gray, 1994). Therefore, it is likely that 
the institutional environment may be more influential to small firms 
than to large firms in setting the terms for internal transfer prices.  
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Proposition 5b: Firms’ concurrent pursuit of efficiency and 
legitimacy in their institutional environment influences their 
selection of transfer pricing method. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This paper contributes to the transfer pricing literature by 
providing a relatively comprehensive set of factors that affect firms’ 
transfer pricing methods. In this paper we explore the impact on 
transfer pricing of the main aspects – the nature of the internal 
transfers, firms’ technological environment, and firms’ social 
environment. By examining transfer pricing through various 
management theoretical lenses, we offer new insights in a 
parsimonious model of firms’ transfer pricing decisions. This is 
important because extant transfer pricing research has been largely 
fragmented and restricted to economics, accounting, taxation, and 
finance studies. By pooling together a more diverse literature and 
ways to analyze transfer pricing, our study contributes to a better 
understanding of transfer pricing in large multidivisional firms. 
This paper has various implications for both practitioners and 
academic researchers. For practitioners, we offer a parsimonious 
model for the analysis of the intertwined determinants of transfer 
pricing by identifying the major factors that should be taken into 
consideration in complex transfer pricing decisions. For example, the 
design of a reward system is an important puzzle for improving firm 
performance. However, for a deliberately designed reward system to 
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work, it must be adjusted to the transfer pricing method. Transfer 
pricing methods based on negotiation may lead to huge waste of time 
and effort when the evaluation and reward of subunits are based on 
their individual financial performance. For academic research, we 
identify an important research gap that has been largely unattended 
to. Transfer pricing carries significant inferences for the firm’s 
strategic management, which warrants more attention from 
researchers. In addition to the arguments developed in this paper 
there are various promising avenues for future research. For 
instance, future research may observe specific aspects of each of the 
factors we examined, such as the impact of strategic partnerships 
and alliances in the context of the external social environment.  
In addition, several interaction possibilities related to firms’ 
internal social environments may be analyzed. First, transfer prices, 
trust, and authority may be jointly used to cope with asset specificity. 
In large multidivisional firms, it is often difficult to assess accurately 
asset specificity, and relatively autonomous subunits typically have 
the option to buy outside. Although the hierarchical governance has 
been suggested to incorporate the production of idiosyncratic assets 
to reduce opportunistic hazards (Williamson, 1985), the hierarchical 
control of asset specificity arising from inside may not be sufficient. 
Under such conditions, trust and transfer pricing methods may be 
jointly utilized and possible interactions should be studied. Second, 
social relationships need to be taken into consideration when 
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analyzing how the technologies utilized require certain transfer 
pricing methods. Due to information asymmetry between the 
headquarters and the subunits, it is impossible to exert complete 
control over each internal transfer. Thus, trust may have a facilitating 
role on the definition of the transfer prices when technological 
requirements are critical. Therefore, the interaction between trust 
and technological requirements appears interesting for future 
research.  
Furthermore, the uncertainty involved in a firm’s technological 
environment may also exert influence on its simultaneous 
consideration of survival and efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This 
is because when faced with unstable and uncertain environments 
organizations tend to imitate the practices of other organizations that 
they perceive as successful (Haveman, 1993). If high technology 
industries experience higher uncertainty than traditional/mature 
industries, it is likely that we may observe higher variety of transfer-
pricing methods in high-technology industries than in 
traditional/mature industries.   
This paper focuses on multidivisional firms regardless of their 
geographic scope. Transfer pricing decisions and methods are not 
bound exclusively to MNCs. Nonetheless, the MNCs may encounter 
more difficulties in transfer pricing than their domestic counterparts. 
This is also because MNCs operate across taxation jurisdictions that 
make both taxation considerations and internal coordination issues 
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even more complex. Furthermore, MNCs are likely to face additional 
differences across their internal institutional environments, 
influencing the selection of transfer pricing methods for foreign 
subsidiaries. Further research may be prospective to examine how an 
MNC’s transfer pricing strategy balances between external and 
internal institutional pressures, and the pressures imposed by the 
home and host country institutional environments.  
To conclude, transfer pricing concerns are not bound only to 
taxation considerations. Both the characteristics of internal transfers, 
internal and external technological environments, and internal and 
external social environments exert influences on the transfer pricing 
practices adopted in a multidivisional firm. Therefore, transfer pricing 
should be treated as a key strategic dimension in the management 
literature and in practitioners’ checklist.  
 
REFERENCES 
Adler, R. 1996. Transfer pricing for world-class manufacturing. Long Range 
Planning, 29(1): 69-75. 
Arrow, K. 1974. The limits of organization ([1st ] ed.). New York,: Norton. 
Barrett, M. E. & Slape, M. 2000. Cast study: Northwestern Paper Company. 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 42(5): 597-602. 
Barringer, M. & Milkovich, G. 1998. A theoretical exploration of the adoption and 
design of flexible benefit plans: A case of human resource innovation. 
Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 305-324. 
Boer, D. 1999. Tax aspects of transfer pricing: 1-31: Ernst & Young's Transfer 
Pricing Group. 
Brews, P. & Hunt, M. 1999. Learning to plan and planning to learn: Resolving the 
planning school/learning school debate. Strategic Management Journal, 
20(10): 889-913. 
 - 32 - 
Brickley, J., Smith, C., Jr., & Zimmerman, J. 2001. Managerial economics and 
organizational architecture (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. 1998. Models of the multinational enterprise. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 29(1): 21-44. 
Burt, R. S. 1997. The contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42(2): 339-365. 
Cats-Baril, W., Gatti, J., & Grinnell, D. 1988. Transfer pricing in a dynamic 
environment. Management Accounting: 30-33. 
Colbert, G. & Spicer, B. 1995. A multi-case investigation of a theory of the transfer 
pricing process. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(6): 423-456. 
Coleman, J. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal 
of Sociology, 94(Supplement): S95-S120. 
Cox, J., Howe, W. & Boyd, L. 1997. Transfer pricing effects on locally measured 
organizations. Management Accounting, March/April: 20-29. 
Cravens, K. 1997. Examining the role of transfer pricing as a strategy for 
multinational firms. International Business Review, 6(2): 127-145. 
DiMaggio, P. & Powell, W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological 
Review, 48(2): 147-160. 
Dubini, P. & Aldrich, H. 1991. Personal and extended networks are central to the 
entrepreneurial process. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(5): 305-313. 
Eccles, R. 1985. The transfer pricing problem: A theory for practice: Lexington, 
Mass. : Lexington Books, c1985. 
Eden, L. & Boos, M. 2003. Transfer pricing issues in the 21st century. Paper 
presented at the Eastern Academy of Management, Oporto, Portugal. 
Eden, L., & Li, D. 2003. Who should set transfer prices? Paper presented at the 
Strategic Management Society 23rd Annual International Conference, 
Baltimore, Maryland. 
Eden, L., & Yeung, B. 2003. Transfer pricing: Thinking like a manager. Paper 
presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA. 
Egelhoff, W. G. 1982. Strategy and structure in multinational corporations: An 
information-processing approach. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(3): 
435-458. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1): 57-74. 
Ernst & Young. 2001. Transfer pricing 2001 global survey: Making Informed 
Decisions in Uncertain Times. Washington, DC: Ernst and Young 
International. 
 - 33 - 
Ghoshal, S. & Nohria, N. 1989. Internal differentiation within multinational 
corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 10(4): 323-337. 
Govindarajan, V. & Fisher, J. 1990. Strategy, Control Systems, and Resource 
Sharing: Effects on Business-Unit Performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 33(2): 259-285. 
Gox, R. 2000. Strategic transfer pricing, absorption costing, and observability. 
Management Accounting Research, 11: 327-348. 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 3: 481-510. 
Grebmer, K. 1987. International transfer pricing in pharmaceutical industry. 
Intertax, 4-5: 92-99. 
Greening, D. & Gray, B. 1994. Testing a model of organizational response to social 
and political issues. Academy of Management Journal, 37(3): 467-498. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choices in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 
85-112. 
Gulati, R. 1998. Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4 - 
Special Issue Supplement): 293-317. 
Haunschild, P. & Miner, A. 1997. Modes of interorganizational imitation: The effects 
of outcome salience and uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
42(3): 472-500. 
Haveman, H. 1993. Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new 
markets. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4): 593-627. 
Hayek, F. 1937. Economics and knowledge. Economica, February: 33-54. 
Hirshleifer, J. 1956. On the economics of transfer pricing. Journal of Business: 172-
184. 
Holmstrom, B. & Tirole, J. 1991. Transfer pricing and organizational form. Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organizations, 7: 201-288. 
Lant, T. & Mezias, S. 1990. Managing Discontinuous Change: A Simulation Study of 
Organizational Learning and Entrepreneurship. Strategic Management 
Journal, 11(Summer): 147-179. 
Lawrence, P. & Lorsch, J. 1967. Organization and environment; managing 
differentiation and integration. Boston: Division of Research Graduate School 
of Business Administration Harvard University. 
Liebeskind, J., Oliver, A., Zucker, L. & Brewer, M. 1996. Social networks, learning, 
and flexibility: Sourcing scientific knowledge in new biotechnology firms. 
Organization Science, 7(4): 428-443. 
 - 34 - 
Meyer, J. & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and cermony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2): 340-363. 
Oliver, C. 1990. Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and 
future directions. Academy of Management Review, 15(2): 241-265. 
Oliver, C. 1997. Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and 
resource-based views. Strategic Management Journal, 18(9): 697-713. 
Ouchi, W. 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organization control 
mechanisms. Management Science., 25: 833-848. 
Powell, W. & Smith-Doerr, L. 1994. Networks and economic life. In N. Smelser, & R. 
Swedberg (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 368-402. 
Scott, W. 1998. Organizations: Rational, natural, and open systems (4th ed.). 
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Sidgwick, H. 1901. The Principles of Political Economy (3 ed.). London: Macmillan. 
Spicer, B. 1988. Towards an organizational theory of the transfer pricing process. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society: 302-322. 
Stewart, T. 1993. The new face of American power. Fortune, July 26: 72. 
Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of 
best practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Winter): 
27-43. 
Tang, R. 1993. Transfer pricing in the 1990s : tax and management perspectives. 
Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books. 
Tang, R. 2002. Current Trends and Corporate Cases in Transfer Pricing. Westport, 
Connecticut; London: Quorum Books. 
Thompson, J. 1967. Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative 
theory. New York,: McGraw-Hill. 
Westland, J. 1992. Congestion and network externalities in the short run pricing of 
information system services. Management Science, 38(7): 992-1009. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, 
relational contracting. New York: Free Press. 
Zucker, L. 1986. Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 
1840-1920. Research in Organizational Behavior, 8: 53-111. 
 
 
 FIGURE 1. A conceptual model of transfer pricing 
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